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SANCTIONS AND THE
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES:
FOCUS ON THE JAEA'
STEPHEN GOROVE*

NTERNATIONAL CONTROL

in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy

constitutes a large and complex task.' On the global level, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has, for some time now, been
assuming an increasing role in this endeavor 2 and is now looking forward to an even wider application of international inspection and veri-

t This article is the outgrowth of a study and on-the-spot survey sponsored by
the American Society of International Law, involving international procedures
and techniques developed to control the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The
author gratefully acknowledges the generous support and counsel obtained from
the Society and its Advisory Group as well as the assistance received through
personal interviews with officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This article expresses the views of the author.
* Chairman of the Graduate Program of the School of Law and Professor of
Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. J.D., University of Budapest,
1939; LL.M., Yale University, 1950; J.S.D., Yale University, 1952; Ph.D., Yale
University, 1955.
1 For concise, comparative reviews of the various international systems exercising control over the peaceful uses of atomic energy, see Gorove, Controls over
Atoms-for-Peace: Some Facts and Implications for Nuclear Disarmament, 27
LA. L. REV. 36 (1966); Hall, Atoms For Peace, or War, 43 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
602 (1965); Wolff, The Legal and Factual Problems of International Security
Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 4 DIRrrro ED EcONOMIA NUCLEARE 179

(1962).
2 On the enhanced role, perspectives and expectations of the IAEA, see Gorove,
Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1525 (1967);
Gorove, Transferring U. S. Bilateral Safeguards to the International Atomic
Energy Agency: the "Umbrella" Agreements, 6 DUQ. U.L. REV. 1 (1967). For

a general discussion of JAEA control procedures, see Szasz, Legal and Administrative Problems Arising from the Implementation of International Atomic
Energy Safeguards, in PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 116 (Series X, Law and
Administration, vol. 4, at 116 et seq. 1966).
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fication procedures following the conclusion
of the Nonproliferation Treaty. 3
One of the major control responsibilities
of the IAEA is to assure that nuclear
materials, facilities and equipment which
have been pledged exclusively for peaceful
purposes will not be diverted to military
uses.4 Perhaps the most frequently encountered questions in connection with this
assurance relate to enforcement procedures or sanctions and the settlement of
disputes. What happens in the case of noncompliance by a state with its assumed
pledge not to use certain designated materials, facilities and equipment for military purposes? What if there is some other
noncompliance with accepted control procedures such as opposition to international inspection of a nuclear plant or
facility which by agreement has been
placed under Agency (IAEA) safeguards?

3 Under I of art. VI of the Nonproliferation
Treaty, reproduced in 59 DEP'T STATE BULL. 9
(1968), each nonnuclear weapon state party to
the Treaty undertakes to accept IAEA safeguards for the exclusive purpose of verifying
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under
the Treaty with a view toward preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. For analyses of the Treaty provisions
and its implications, see M. WILLRICH, NONPROLIFERATION TREATY:

FRAMEWORK

FOR NUCLEAR

(1969); Bunn, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 766.
4 The IAEA is charged by its statute to establish and administer a system of safeguards to
ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its
request or under its supervision or control are
not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
STATUTE [hereinafter IAEA Stat., art. III. A. 4].
ARMS
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Who is liable for violations of individual
or institutional interests such as damage
or injury resulting from an accident occurring in the course of a nuclear inspection? How are disagreements and disputes
to be handled in the delicate area of
atomic energy where the peaceful and military applications are not too far apart? 5
The ensuing discussion attempts to give
some answers to these questions. Specifically, it focuses upon the IAEA sanctions
in case of noncompliance and other encroachments upon individual or institutional interests and follows with an
analysis of the Agency's procedures for
settlement of disputes.
NONCOMPLIANCE

Noncompliance, whether or not it involves diversion or other violation of accepted control procedures, may arise out
of actions by others or by the IAEA itself.6
In the first instance, the statute of the

5 On the problem of differentiating atoms-forpeace from atoms-for-war, see Gorove, Distinguishing "Peaceful" from "Military" Uses of
Atomic Energy: Some Facts and Considerations,
30 OHIO ST. L. J. 495 (1969).
6 Under the Agency's old safeguards system,
incorporated in the Safeguards Document of
1961 (Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/26,
17), "diversion" was defined as
the use by a recipient State of fissionable or
other materials, facilities or equipment supplied by the Agency so as to further any
military purpose or in violation of any other
condition prescribed in the agreement between
the Agency and the State concerning the use
of such materials, facilities or equipment.
In the revised Safeguards Document of 1965
(Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66), there is no definition of diversion but noncompliance would include any violation of accepted control procedures.

Focus ON THE IAEA
IAEA makes it the primary responsibility
of Agency inspectors to determine the existence of a violation. 7 The inspectors are
required to report any noncompliance to
the Director General of the Agency who,
in turn, must forward the report to the
IAEA Board of Governors. 8 The Board
exercises a power of review over the findings of the inspectors, since it is required
to call upon the recipient state or states
"to remedy forthwith" any noncompliance
only if it finds that such has occurred. In
that case the Board is also required to report the noncompliance to all members of
the IAEA and to the Security Council and
General Assembly of the United Nations.
The two latter bodies can take whatever
action is open to them under the U. N.
Charter, including the use of force. However, if corrective action is not taken
within a reasonable time, the Board may
directly curtail or suspend any agency assistance which is being given and call for
the return of materials and equipment
made available to the recipient member.
The return, however, is to be affected by

The IAEA is authorized by its statute to send
into the territory of the recipient state or states
inspectors, designated by the Agency after consultation with the state or states concerned,
who shall have access at all times to all places,
data and any person who, by reason of his occupation, deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by the statute to be
safeguarded as necessary to account for source
and special fissionable materials supplied and
fissionable products, and to determine whether
there is compliance with the undertaking against
use in furtherance of any military purpose, and
with any other conditions prescribed in the
agreement between the Agency and the state or
states concerned. IAEA Stat., art. XII.A.6.
8 Id. art. XII.C.
7

the state or states concerned and the inspectors have no right to remove materials
in the event of noncompliance. Additionally, the Agency may suspend any noncomplying member from the exercise of
the privileges and rights of membership. 9
Many Agency agreements contain additional provisions to the effect that, in the
event of failure by the noncomplying state
to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may suspend the
Agency's responsibility to apply safeguards
originally agreed upon for a period which
the Board determines is not conducive to
effective application."0
The staff of inspectors also has the statutory responsibility to examine all operations conducted by the Agency itself in
order to determine, inter alia, whether the
Agency is taking adequate measures to
prevent the source and special fissionable
materials in its custody or used or pro-

9 Id. See also id. art. XII.A.7. During the negotiations relating to the drafting of the IAEA
statute, Poland unsuccessfully proposed that the
Board's decision for the suspension of assistance
and return of materials be made by a twothirds majority vote. Docs. IAEA/CS/art. XII/
amend. 3 (1956); IAEA/CS/OR. 38, at 32-35
(1956). It may be noted that art. XII.C. of the
statute uses the phrase "return" of materials,
which implies return to the supplier (IAEA or
a state or states), whereas art. XII.A.7 states
that the Agency is authorized to "withdraw"
any materials. No occasion has yet arisen to dispel this apparent discrepancy, but project or
safeguards agreements normally include reference to one or the other article.
10 Trilateral Agreement with the Agency, Japan,
and the United States, Sept. 23, 1963, art. II,
§ 14(a), [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1265, T.I.A.S. No. 5429;
Agency Agreement with the United States, June
15, 1964, art. II, § 13(a), [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1456,
T.I.A.S. No. 5621.
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duced in its own operations from being
used in furtherance of any military purpose. In case of noncompliance, the
Agency is obligated to take remedial action forthwith to correct any failure to
take adequate measures."

VIOLATIONS

OF INDIVIDUAL

INSTITUTIONAL

AND

INTERESTS

Since the Agency engages in a number
of activities through its inspectors and
other officials which may result in injury
to individuals or damage to individual or
institutional interests, a brief consideration
of the legal framework of protective sanctions seems appropriate.
Liability for Injury or Damage
In Absence of InternationalAgreement
Generally, in the absence of an international agreement governing liability, the
Agency and its officials (including inspectors) would be liable for injury or damage
caused by the officials through negligence
or willful misconduct in connection with
their duties. In this respect, it seems convenient to distinguish between damage resulting from unauthorized disclosure of
industrial secrets and other confidential
information, and damage or injury arising
from other activities.
A.

Unauthorized Disclosure of
Industrial Secrets and Other
Confidential Information

The unauthorized disclosure of industrial secrets and other confidential information by an official (inspector) of the

11 IAEA Stat. Art. XII.B.
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Agency who has acquired such information
in the course of his duty may make the
Agency as well as the official liable for
damages to the owner of such information.
The existence and extent of such liability
would depend upon the circumstances of
the disclosure and the nature of damages
suffered. More specifically, it would be
necessary to determine whether the official
knew or had reason to believe that the
information was confidential and whether
the disclosure related to information which
the owner had intended to keep secret or
for which he had intended to acquire a
patent.
The ad hoc committee of the Agency's
inspectors did not include in their document any provision concerning the inspector's obligation not to disclose any industrial secrets or other confidential
information he might learn by virtue of
his official duties. The committee noted,
however, that such a provision had already been included in the Safeguards
Document and, furthermore, that all
Agency officials were, in any case, bound
by the statutory stipulations as well as by
the Staff Regulations. 12 Under these various restrictions, the Agency staff, which
includes inspectors, is under an obligation

12 Id. art. VII.F; Docs. IAEA/GC(V)/INF/39
(Inspectors Document, 1961); IAEA/INFCIRC/
6. Rev. 1, Staff Regulation 1.06 (1961); IAEA/
INFCIRC/26 at 6 (Safeguards Document,
13
1961). See also Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66,
(revised Safeguards Document, 1965) and the
relevant provisions of various safeguards agreements. For details on the latter, see Gorove,
Transferring U.S. Bilateral Safeguards to the
International Atomic Energy Agency: The "Umbrella" Agreements, 6 DUQ. U.L. REV. 1, 12

(1967).
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not to disclose any industrial secret or
other confidential information encountered
due to their position, except to the Director General and other staff members
authorized to have such information for
the discharge of their official duties.
Agency inspectors are expected to be especially cognizant of this obligation
because any violation may result in disciplinary measures against them, including
summary dismissal. Moreover, the Agency
may, in an appropriate case and under
national laws for the protection of professional secrets, bring suit in the courts of
a member state against the official or exofficial in order to prevent any unauthorized disclosure or to recover damages.
B.

Other Activities: Nonnuclear
and Nuclear Incidents

In addition to liability resulting from
unauthorized disclosure of industrial secrets and other confidential information,
the Agency and its officials may also incur
liability from other activities, such as the
normal nonnuclear accidents caused by an
inspector or other Agency official at headquarters or elsewhere, and nuclear accidents resulting from inspection, test-taking,
measurements, storage, and transportation
of radioactive samples, whenever such
activities are carried out by the inspectors
themselves. Inasmuch as Agency inspectors would normally be instructed to leave
such activities (insofar as this may be possible without prejudicing the effectiveness
of the inspection) to the staff of the inspected facility, and since only small
amounts of nuclear materials would be
involved, these types of accidents would
most likely be of small magnitude.

Liability might also arise in connection
with losses or expenses incurred as a result of compliance with unreasonable operational requests by an inspector, such as
a request for an unscheduled inventory
necessitating a shutdown. 13 If a state considers that the demands of an inspector
are unreasonable and that compliance
would involve a substantial expenditure, it
can, at any time, appeal to the Board for
a decision on the matter. This procedure,
and the further possible recourse to any
arbitral or judicial settlement agreed upon,
may, however, be undertaken only by the
respective state and not independently by
the enterprises or the individuals whose
interests are adversely affected, unless the
Agency agrees to such procedure.
Normally, liability would not be expected to arise in connection with major
operational accidents occurring in an inspected facility as a result of compliance
with unreasonable operational orders by
an inspector, since the latter has no authority to make such orders (and this is
usually made known to both the inspector
and the inspected facility), but can only
request that tests or operations be executed

13 This case is not very likely to occur inas-

much as, subject to the requirement that they
effectively discharge their functions, the visits
and activities of Agency inspectors must be so
arranged as to assure the minimum possible
inconvenience to the state and disturbance to
the facilities inspected. Doc. IAEA/GC(V)/
INF/39,
7 & 8 (1961). See also Gorove,
Maintaining Order Through On-Site Inspection:
Focus on the IAEA, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1536,

1565 (1967). The revised Safeguards Document

provides that a request for shutdown may only
be made by the Board's decision. Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/66, 1 11 (1965).
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by and with the approval of the persons
in charge of the facility who would then
be responsible for the safe execution of
such. 14
Liability Under International Agreement
Under the Agency-sponsored Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, which was signed in Vienna on May
21, 1963, liability for nuclear incidents
would fall upon the operator of the facility
where the accident occurred or from which
the nuclear material, if it is of a type
specified in the Convention, was removed. 15 The operator of the facility normally would have no recourse against the
Agency for damages paid to third parties
and would have a right of recourse against
an inspector personally only if he caused
16
the accident with specific intent.
Apart from the Convention, several
Agency agreements contain stipulations
regarding liability. For example, the agreement with Norway stipulates that neither
the Agency nor any person acting on its
behalf is to bear any liability in connection with the joint program or the reactor
facility and that Norway is to hold them
free from any such liability."
The agreement with the United States
of June 1, 1962 (now expired), provided
that the organization would indemnify the
United States, its officials, agents, employees, contractors and others claiming

14

Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/66,

48 (1965).

15 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nu-

clear Damage, May 21, 1963, art. IV, 1, IAEA,
Legislative Series No. 4, at 3 (1966).
16 Id. art. IV. 2.
17 Art. IX, § 21. Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/29/
Mod. 1 (1961).
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through it, for any injury or damage
caused by the Agency or its inspectors.
However, it also noted that this provision
did not deprive the Agency or its inspectors of any rights under the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, and that the reactoi
facilities were covered by indemnificatior
agreements pursuant to that Act. s

PROCEDURES FOR SETTLEMENT OF

DISPUTES

Provisions
The IAEA statute envisages a special
procedure for the settlement of disputes.
Under article XVII, any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the statute which is not settled
by negotiation is to be referred to the
International Court of Justice unless the
parties concerned agree on another mode
of settlement. While the IAEA may not
be party to a dispute 19 before the International Court of Justice, the Agency's
General Conference and its Board are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the
United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory
opinion on any legal question arising
20
within the Agency's activities.

18 Art. VI, § 14 [1962] 1 U.S.T. 415, T.I.A.S.

No. 5002.
19 A genuine dispute between the Agency and a
state is not considered as having arisen unless

the Board or the General Conference is involved
on the Agency's part. Thus, any other disagreement at a lower level (involving only the
Agency's inspectors,

its Inspector General, or

its Director General) would not constitute a
genuine dispute.
20 In November 1957, when the General As-
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Furthermore, by the terms of article
XI.F.6. of the statute, appropriate provisions must be included in all IAEA project agreements concerning the settlement
of disputes. While this requirement is limited to project agreements, other types of
safeguards agreements routinely include
such stipulations to the effect that any
dispute with respect to the interpretation
or application of the relevant agreement
which is not settled by negotiation or as
may otherwise be agreed, is, at the request
of either party, to be submitted to an arbitral tribunal. The two parties involved
each designate one arbitrator and the two
arbitrators so named appoint a third, who
acts as the chairman. If, within 30 days
of the request for arbitration, either party
has not designated an arbitrator, either
party to the dispute may request the
President of the International Court of
Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same
procedure applies if, within 30 days of
the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not
been appointed. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal constitutes a
quorum, and decisions are made by a majority vote. The procedures of the arbitration are fixed by the tribunal, whose
decisions (including all rulings concerning
procedure, jurisdiction, and division of the

sembly approved the relationship agreement
with the Agency, it also authorized the latter
to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities other than
questions concerning the relationship between
the Agency and the United Nations or any specialized agency. Docs. IAEA/GC(II)/INF/12
(1958); IAEA/GC/II/39 at 12 (1958); G.A.
Res. 1146, 12 U.N.

expenses of arbitration between the par..'
21
ties) are binding on all parties.

To further develop this subject, the trilateral agreement among the Agency,
Japan, and the United States provides that,
should the dispute involve all three parties
to the agreement, each party designates
one arbitrator and the three will, by unanimous agreement, appoint a fourth arbitrator, who will be the chairman, plus a
fifth arbitrator. If however, within 30 days
of the request for arbitration, a party has
not designated an arbitrator, either of the
remaining parties can request the President of the International Court of Justice
to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure is applied if, within 30 days of the
designation of the three arbitrators, the
chairman or the fifth arbitrator has not
been appointed. 22 There is also a provision

for interim decisions and orders and a
stipulation that all decisions, rulings, and
See, e.g., Agency agreements with: the Congo
(Leopoldville, now Kinshasa), art. X, § 12,
Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/37 (1962); Finland, art.
VIII. 1, Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/24 (1960); Norway, art. XI, § 24, Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/Mod.
1 (1961); Pakistan, art. X, § 13, Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/34 (1962); United States, June 1,
1962, art. VIII, § 17 (1962) 1 U.S.T. 415,
T.I.A.S. No. 5002; Yugoslavia, art. VII, § 11,
Doc. IAEA/INFCIRC/32 (1961); ef. art. V
of the Agency Agreement with Japan, Doc.
IAEA/INFCIRC/3, II (1959), which provides
that the President of the International Court of
Justice shall appoint the third member of the
arbitrational tribunal if the first two members
do not agree on the designation of the third
member within three months after the making
of the application.
22 Article VI, § 20 of the Trilateral Agreement
with the Agency, Japan, and the United States,
Sept. 23, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1265, T.I.A.S.
No. 5429. For details, see Gorove, supra note
12, at 11.
21

16
Irders of the tribunal are to be implemented by the parties in accordance with
23
their respective constitutional procedures.
In case of any dispute involving the application of an agreement regarding
Agency inspectors, safeguards against diversion, or changes in the project, the
decisions of the Board are, if they so provide, to be given immediate effect by the
respective country, pending the conclusion
of any consultation, negotiation, or arbitration that may be or may have been in24
voked with regard to the dispute.
All disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Agreement on
the Privileges and Immunities of the
Agency are to be referred to the International Court of Justice unless the parties
(states) agree on another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the
Agency and a member and they do not
agree on any other mode of settlement, a
request is made for an advisory opinion
on any relevant legal question. The opinion given by the court must be accepted
25
by the parties as decisive.

23 See art. VI, § 20; Agency Agreement with

the United States, June 15, 1964, art. VI, § 18
[1964] 2 U.S.T. 1456, T.I.A.S. No. 5621. For
details, see Gorove, supra note 12, at 11.
24 See cited Agency agreements, notes 21 & 22,
supra, with: the Congo, art. X, § 13; Pakistan,
art. X, § 14; ef. cited Agency agreements with:
Finland, art. VIII, 2; Japan and the United
States, art. VI, § 21; Norway, art. XI, § 25;
United States, June 1, 1962, art. VIII, § 18;
United States, June 15, 1964, art. VI, § 19;
Yugoslavia, art. VII, § 12.
25 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities
of the IAEA, art. X, § 34, Doc. IAEA/
INFCIRC/9/ Rev. 1 (1959). For details, see
Gorove, Privileges and Immunities of International Atomic Inspectors, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
497 (1970).
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Disputes and Procedure
Against the Agency
If a state decides that it has a claim
against the Agency based on any action
or omission of an Agency official (inspector), it can demand reparation from the
organization and, if unsuccessful, then invoke the procedure for settlement of disputes provided in the relevant agreement.
When any other party (such as the operator of an inspected facility, if such is
not the state itself, or any other third
party not contractually related to the
Agency) presents a claim against the
Agency which the latter is not prepared
to satisfy directly, the organization can
require the claimant to advance it through
his state. The Agency could also waive its
own immunity in the appropriate national
court or propose some ad hoc method of
adjudicating its liability, such as by arbitration.26
While the Agency may seek reimbursement from the inspector concerned, in
most cases it could not expect to have any
major damages covered in this way. Therefore the Agency normally carries insurance
to cover itself for the inspector's activities.

26 The Agency does not have an internal tribunal like the one established by the Security
Control Convention of December 20, 1957 of
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now known as the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development). See
Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of
the European Nuclear Energy Agency, 7 VA. J.
INT'L L. 68, 82 (1967). It may also be noted
that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization
(ILO) is limited to disputes brought by ILO
officials. See Statute of the Administrative Tri4 & 5.
bunal of the ILO, art. II,
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Disputes and Procedure Against
the Inspected State
If Agency property is damaged during
the course of an inspection, the Agency
may advance its claim against the state
or the facility in which the damage occurred. If the claim is not settled by negotiation, the Agency may resort to the
disputes procedure provided for in the
relevant agreement.
If an Agency inspector suffers injury in
the course of an inspection, he may bring
a claim against the state or the facility in
which the injury occurred. If he is unable
to obtain satisfactory compensation, he
may, in addition to obtaining the compensation due him for injuries incurred in the
course of service, request the Agency .to
espouse his claim. The Agency, acting in
its own behalf or on behalf of its inspector,
may, if necessary, invoke the disputes stipulations incorporated into the appropriate
27
agreement.
ASSESSMENT

The preceding analysis of IAEA sanctions and the procedures for the settlement of disputes lends itself to a number
The Ad Hoc Committee on the Agency's
Inspectors decided to omit a provision from the
Inspectors Document which would have required a state to warn Agency inspectors of any
danger of radiation or radioactive contamination that might be encountered during their
inspections. The Committee felt that such a provision would raise difficult questions of possible
state liability to the Agency or its inspectors,
and should consequently not be dealt with in
the Inspectors Document. However, the Com27

of observations. The IAEA, like other
international organizations, has extremely
limited authority to deal with noncompliance. Having no physical force at its disposal to support its authority, it must
necessarily rely upon the cooperation of
the member states to assure observance of
statutory obligations. When faced with a
clear-cut diversion or other substantial violation, the most it can do is request the
return of the materials and equipment
from the noncomplying recipient state and
report the violation to the United Nations,
an organization proven to be largely ineffective as an instrument for the legitimate use of force. In view of these
considerations, one may wonder how the
IAEA could have expected to accomplish,
and indeed could have accomplished, its
functions without major disputes or significant incidents of noncompliance which,
according to all indications, appears to
be the case. The reason seems to lie first
of all in the fact that IAEA safeguards
apply only to certain designated materials,
facilities and equipment which have been
voluntarily earmarked for peaceful purposes, and do not apply to atoms destined
for military use, such as nuclear weapons.
Thus the benefits, if any, to be gained from
diversion would be negligible inasmuch as
countries may have their own military
programs not subject to IAEA controls.
A more formidable test for the effectiveness of Agency sanctions may come with
the eventual policing of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America.28

mittee recommended that the parties concerned
should include appropriate provisions on this
subject in the project and safeguards agree-

ments.

28

Under art. I of the Treaty for the Prohibi-

16
While these agreements are not intended
to prevent nuclear weapons states from
increasing their stockpiles of atomic arms,
they aim to prevent the acquisition or
manufacture of atomic weapons by nonnuclear weapons states. Thus, once the
nonnuclear weapons states adhere to these
treaties and accept the application of
JAEA safeguards to all of their nuclear
materials, equipment, and facilities, the
subsequent temptation for diversion may
assume significant dimension, especially if
countries are involved in a major armed
conflict or face a serious military confrontation.
The final test, however, of the JAEA
provisions for the application of sanctions

tion of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (also
known as the Tlatelolco Treaty) Feb. 14, 1967,

reproduced in 6

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

521

(1967), the contracting parties undertake to use
the nuclear materials and facilities, which are
under their jurisdiction, exclusively for peaceful
purposes, and to prohibit and prevent in their
respective territories:
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production
or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any
nuclear weapons, by the parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else
or in any other way; and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the
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and the settlement of disputes would come
only as a result of the direct application
of Agency safeguards to atomic military
stockpiles of nuclear weapons states in an
agreement on disarmament or the reduction or control of armaments. If such a
situation eventually develops, it is expected
that any nuclear weapons state will insist
upon additional safeguards and sanctions
commensurate with the degree of effect that
diversion by another state would have on
its military posture. and overall security.
At that time, if the IAEA is to assume
major control responsibilities, its procedures will have to be backed up by an
effective world organization with full authority and actual ability to use force, if
necessary, against a recalcitrant state.

parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf
or in any other way.
The contracting parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way
participating in the testing, use, manufacture,
production, possession or control of any nuclear
weapon.
Under art. 13 of the same Treaty the parties
also undertake to negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with the IAEA for the application of its safeguards to their nuclear
activities. For a general discussion of the Treaty
provisions, see G. ROBLES, EL TRATADO DE
TLATELOLCO (1968). See also Robinson, The
Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1970).

